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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN MINNESOTA
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I. INTRODUCTION: RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING HAVE BEEN
RECEDING
Prior to the 1970s, a strict proscription of advertising, solicitation, and
publicity efforts by attorneys was a fundamental part of the various ABA
Codes of Professional Responsibility. 1 This fundamental position was
eroded considerably during the 1970s, leaving only skeletal remains of
1. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908); ABA MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
Broad limitations on lawyers' communications to the public were first adopted in
1908, when the American Bar Association promulgated its Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics. Canon 27 declared that "It is unprofessional to solicit professional
employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal com-
munications or interviews not warranted by personal relations."
Shadur, Public'y, Advertising, and Solicitation, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE
FOR ATTORNEYS 45 (1978). Shadur further notes that the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics "also stated that indirect advertising, such as newspaper comments, publicity
photos, and 'like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession
and are reprehensible.' " Id From 1908 to 1977, all states that codified lawyer discipli-
nary rules had also adopted the essence of the American Bar Association's restrictions on
lawyer advertising. See id. at 45-46.
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the older taboos for the 1980s. 2 The residues of earlier absolute prohibi-
tions are not likely to disappear, and respect for the motives behind the
older rules still guides the formation of the rules that are taking their
place.3
II. INITIAL BREAKTHROUGHS UNDER GOLDFARB V STATE BAR
Like the older rules themselves, the seminal case, Goldfarb v. State Bar, 4
which set the foundation for much of the change that has followed, has
receded into the background in comparison to other landmark deci-
sions. 5 The Goldfarb Court in essence found the practice of law to be
commerce subject to antitrust standards. The Goldfarb decision
spearheaded the public reaction to professional standards for the distri-
bution of legal services that has, ultimately, opened up attorney advertis-
ing.6 The Goldfarb Court found that mandatory minimum fee schedules
indirectly imposed and enforced by a state bar were in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 The realization that professional guidelines
could severely impair the distribution of legal services caused the public
to critically scrutinize other guidelines or codes dealing with service
availability.8 Advertising and solicitation were in the direct path of this
new scrutiny.
In an attempt to first establish its own position in response to the scru-
tiny of professional standards, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility proposed limited expansion of attorney
advertising after Goldfarb. 9 The focus of these early proposals was on
making legal services more readily available, rather than on encouraging
2. See MODEL CODE EC 2-6 to EC 2-15, DR 2-101 (1980).
3. See Resolution Regarding Lawyer Advertising, 32 BENCH & B. MINN., Jan. 1976, at 3
(reaction of Minnesota Bar to the ABA discussion draft of December 6, 1975, which pro-
posed to lift the ban on some forms of advertising, was very much against the suggested
changes).
4. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5. See Hoover, Lawyer Advertising---Mnnesota Supreme Court Action, 37 BENCH & B.
MINN., July 1980, at 11. "Prior to the 1977 Bates decision, virtually all advertising and
solicitation was prohibited. In April, 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended DR
2-101 of the Code of Rrofessional Responsibiity, to permit certain forms of advertisements."
Id
6. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising by attorneys in legal
clinic allowed).
7. See Goldfarb v. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975). "In the modern world it
cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial
intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on com-
merce." Id at 788.
8. See R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 32, 115, 132,
163, 233 (1980) (doors to public and legislative scrutiny were opened by Supreme Court
classification of law firms and their business as interstate commerce).
9. See Lawyer Advertising, 32 BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 1976, at 2, 19 (the initial re-
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active commercial dissemination of information.10 Yet, members of the
Minnesota State Bar were reluctant to support any effort to make adver-
tising presumptively ethical, even within a context of proposed code pro-
visions which were still decidedly regulative. I
III. FURTHER EXPANSION UNDER BATES V STATE BAR
Perspectives began to change more rapidly after Bates v. State Bar. 12 In
Bates, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an Arizona attorney
who placed a newspaper ad listing his fees for routine, standardized legal
services could not be disciplined by his state bar. 13 Under this ruling,
states may only prohibit false or misleading advertising by attorneys.
The state bar association ban on advertising by lawyers as a class, and
individually, was held to violate the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution.14 Overnight, the more limited proposals of the ABA
became obsolete and the states were forced to liberalize their attitudes




The Minnesota State Bar Association set up a task force to review the
impact of the Bates case and to draft an amendment to the Minnesota
Code of Professional Responsibility to accommodate the Bates holding. 17
Interestingly enough, the Bates Court concluded that the Sherman Anti-
trust Act does not forbid limitations on lawyer advertising that are part
of a state's system of lawyer regulation policed by the state's supreme
court. 18 Thus, after the Bates opinion, the Goldfarb holding has had less
direct impact upon advertising than upon fee setting. '9 Furthermore,
Bates recognizes that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the
10. See Brink, Lawyer Advertising, 32 BENCH & B. MINN., Jan. 1976, at 20, 21. "To the
extent that there is a public need for better information about lawyers, it would be better
to expand affirmatively the list of what lawyers can do than to permit everything, re-
strained only by relatively subjective judgments about what may be prohibited as mislead-
ing." Id at 21.
11. See id. at 21. "As a consequence, under the existing Rule, conduct not expressly
sanctioned was presumptively unethical; under the Draft, the many doubtful cases are
presumptively ethical." Id See also MODEL CODE DR 2-101 (1969).
12. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
13. See id at 383-84.
14. See id. at 363-82; see also Comment, Attorney Advertising is Commercial Speech Protected
by the First Amendment: Bates v. State Bar, 37 MD. L. REV. 350, 363-64 (1977).
15. See Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited" The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Can-
tor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977).
16. See Bates and O'Steen. . . Where Do We Go From Here? The Task Force on Lawyer
Advertising-An Update, 34 BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 1977, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Task
Force Update]. "Beyond [the] specific holding the Court recognized a general constitu-
tional principle that a lawyer has a right to publish, and the public has a right to know,
truthful commercial statements that assist members of the public in the selection of a
lawyer." Id at 20.
17. See id.,. see also Lawyer Advertising, 34 BENCH & B. MINN., Dec. 1977, at 14.
18. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-63.
19. See id at 359.
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time, place, and manner of lawyer advertising.20 Hence, the ABA pro-
posals regulating advertising, before and after their modification by the
Minnesota bar, were not invalidated by Bates, 2 1 and provided legitimate
time, place, and manner guidelines.
IV. COMPETING PROPOSALS SUGGESTED BY THE ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS
The Bates decision permits lawyers to advertise factual information in
newspapers and print media but does not rule on the propriety of using
the broadcast media or of using assertions regarding quality by attor-
neys.2 2 The ABA directed its attention to the permissible scope of fac-
tual advertising and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics developed
proposals for consideration. 23 The competing proposals were entitled
Proposals A, B, and C. Proposal C was a modified pre-Bates proposal
that made advertising presumptively ethical within a regulative con-
text,24 received serious consideration by the Minnesota bar after the
Bates opinion. The two post-Bates proposals, however, Proposal A (regu-
lative) and Proposal B (directive), have dominated discussion and have
been adopted by numerous states and bar associations.
25
V. THE MINNESOTA APPROACH
Initially taking an apparently restrictive approach, the Minnesota bar
favored Proposals A and C,26 finding the open-ended approach of Propo-
sal B to be without sufficient regulative guidelines. 27 After the ABA had
adopted Proposal A into the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (Model Code), the following observations were made by the Min-
nesota State Bar task force on the merits of Proposal C:
20. See id. at 362, 383-84.
21. See 1980 Panel Actions, 37 BENCH & B. MINN., May 1981, at 14 (The Board of
Professional Responsibility processed six claims for misleading advertising in 1980).
22. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANN. C. PROF.
REsP. 28-29 (1979).
23. See Task Force Update, supra note 16, at 20, 22.
24. See id at 22.
25. See REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY LAWYERS: COMPARISONS OF THE ABA
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STATE CODES (1977) (sets forth
the various state rules regulating attorney advertising); Blackmar, The Missouri Supreme
Court and Lawyer Advertzsing." RMJ and its Afiermath, 47 Mo. L. REV. 621, 629 (1982) (most
of the states that considered the problem of advertising after Bates expressed a preference
for the Proposal A form of regulation).
26. See Task Force Update, supra note 16, at 19. "Proponents of both Proposals [A and
C] are seeking the public good and, consistent with that, to retain wholesome standards of
professionalism." Id at 20.
27. For a discussion of various weaknesses of the early drafts of the proposals, see
Brink, supra note.10, at 21-24. It was thought that "the Draft should be equally severe and
equally definite on such things as use of large and frequent displays, costly or 'unprofes-
sional' media and overuse of biographical matter." Id at 23.
19831
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The proponents of Proposal C urge that the bar recognize its engage-
ment in a truly commercial activity, and that today, advertising is part
and parcel of that commercial activity. Thus, Proposal C would only
prohibit a lawyer from advertising in a manner inimical to the public
interest, leaving to the individual lawyer the determination of form
and place for any public communication concerning his practice, his
fees, and his background. Certainly, from a public relations point of
view, it would be far better for the bar to take the lead on the advertis-
ing issue rather than doing only the bare minimum the U.S. Supreme
Court requires ...
Proposal C, on the other hand, focuses not on mechanics or form,
but on substance. What it attempts to prevent is real harm to the pub-
lic which would result from claims which are fraudulent or deceptive
or which raise matters specifically prohibited in the list of nine "do
nots" . *.28
Under Proposal C, an advertisement would have been prohibited only
if it:
(1) contains a misrepresentation of fact;
(2) is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it makes only a
partial disclosure of relevant facts;
(3) contains laudatory statements about a lawyer;
(4) is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified expectations of
favorable results;
(5) implies unusual legal ability, other than as permitted by DR 2-105;
(6) conveys the impression that the lawyer is in a position to influence
improperly any court, tribunal, or other public body or official;
(7) is intended or likely to result in a legal action or legal position be-
ing taken or asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure
another;
(8) is intended or is likely to appeal primarily to a lay person's fears,
greed, desires for revenge, or similar emotions;
(9) contains other representations or implications that in reasonable
probability will cause an ordinary, prudent person to misunder-
stand or be deceived.
29
In addition, DR 2-105 would have allowed a lawyer to set forth a special-
ization in fair, non-misleading terms.30
Provisionally, with input from the practicing bar, the Minnesota State
Bar Association Board of Governors recommended to the Minnesota
Supreme Court that Proposal A be adopted.3 This proposal would have
made Minnesota consistent with the Model Code. At the time Proposal
A was thought to give the well-intentioned lawyer more guidance about
28. See Task Force Update, supra note 16, at 24.
29. Id at 22.
30. See id. at 21. Proposal C allows, without restriction or guidance, lawyers to indi-
cate the fields of law in which they practice.
31. See Lawyer Advertising, supra note 17, at 14.
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the kinds of permissible advertising.32
Ultimately Minnesota adopted Proposal B, in favor of constitutional
defensibility, and rejected the regulative language found in both Propos-
als A and C.33 These other proposals would limit certain aspects of law-
yer advertising before it could be evaluated as commercially false or
misleading. Proposal C was regulative as to quality, while Proposal A, as
incorporated into the Model Code, is regulative as to means. 34 Follow-
ing the Bates holding on advertising, the Proposal B approach adopted in
Minnesota, also known as the "directive" approach, requires only that
advertising avoid being untruthful or misleading.
3 5
Compared to Proposals A and C, DR 2-101 of the Minnesota Code of
Professional Responsibility now simply provides attorneys with commer-
cial directives:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate
in the use of any form of advertisement or written communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement
or claim.
(B) A false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement or claim in-
cludes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a misrepresentation of fact;
(2) Is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it makes only
a partial disclosure of relevant facts;
(3) Is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified expecta-
tions of favorable results;
(4) Conveys the impression that the lawyer is in a position to influ-
ence improperly any court, tribunal, or other public body or
official;
(5) Is intended or likely to result in a legal action or legal position
being taken or asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure
another; or
(6) Contains other representations or implications that in reason-
able probability will cause an ordinary, prudent person to mis-
understand or be deceived.
36
The current Minnesota Code provision on advertising has much in
common with the old Proposal C. The major difference is that the Min-
nesota Code does not attempt to directly meddle with "taste" and "dig-
32. See id.
33. See ANN. C. PROF. RESP., supra note 22, at 30-31; see also Some Answers to Questions
about LawyerAdvertising, 35 BENCH & B. MINN., Dec. 1978, at 21; Task Force Update, supra
note 16, at 21.
34. See MODEL CODE DR 2-101, DR 2-102 (1980); see also supra note 29 and accompa-
nying text.
35. See Hoover, supra note 5, at 11; MINN. C. PROF. RESP. DR 2-101(A) (1982).
36. MINN. C. PROF. RESP. DR 2-101 (1982) (this provision was adopted April 14,
1978 and was left unchanged in essential substance by the amendments of 1980).
1983]
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nity" in a regulative fashion.3 7
The regulative approach adopted by the Model Code (Proposal A)
specifically delineates the guidelines an attorney must follow with respect
to the mechanics of his or her advertising.38 The Model Code also at-
tempts to indirectly regulate quality of attorney advertising3 9 by setting
forth a compendium of approved factual contents of advertising, often
called the "laundry list" approach. Since the original adoption of this
regulative list in 1969, the list has grown more inclusive. 4o For instance,
broadcast media advertising, formerly prohibited, is now permitted
under the Model Code.
4 1
With the regulative laundry list, however, the Model Code's constitu-
tional defensibility with respect to advertising has been weakened in an
attempt to gain clarity. By directly limiting the scope of attorney adver-
tising, the Model Code invites first and fourteenth amendment constitu-
tional challenges under Bates. After the Bates decision, attorney
advertising is recognized as a form of protected commercial speech. Any
attempt by a state to set out time, place, and manner restrictions may be
subject to constitutional scrutiny.42 By avoiding the regulative ap-
proach, Minnesota steered clear of potential constitutional challenges
and apparently gave Minnesota attorneys carte blanche to advertise
within the limits of truth and accuracy. The only exception to this broad
approach was the restriction against advertising of specialities within the
legal profession, which was recently declared unconstitutional by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in In reJohnson. 43
37. See Hoover, supra note 5, at 11. "The standard of regulation is, however, truth or
falsity, rather than 'taste' or 'dignity.' " Id
38. See MODEL CODE DR 2-101 to 2-104 (1980).
39. See Task Force Update, supra note 16, at 20. "[Plroposal A regulates, not merely by
prohibiting what is false or misleading, but with respect to those other matters-quality,
solicitation, the electronic media and time, place and manner-that the Supreme Court
suggested could be appropriately regulated." Id
40. Compare MODEL CODE DR 2-101 (1969) (containing three sections and six catego-
ries regulating means) with MODEL CODE DR 2-101 (1980) (containing nine sections and
thirty categories regulating means).
41. See MODEL CODE EC 2-8, DR 2-101 (B), (D), and (I) (1980).
42. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-83; see also ANN. C. PROF. RESP., supra note 22, at 28-29.
The source of the directive language in Proposal B and the MINN. C. PROF. RESP. is
derived from Bates.- "Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject
to restraint." See 433 U.S. at 383.
43. 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a state disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising of a "legitimate spe-
cialization" certification. Richard Johnson had been admonished by the Minnesota
Board of Professional Responsibility for advertising his certification by the National Board
of Trial Advocacy as a civil trial specialist in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-105(B) of the
Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 2-105(B) stated: "A lawyer shall not
hold out himself or his firm as a specialist unless and until the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopts or authorizes rules or regulations permitting him to do so." MINN. C. PROF. RESP.
DR 2-105(B) (1980). The court relied onIn reR.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) and concluded
[Vol. 9
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By choosing the directive approach, Minnesota has put both its attor-
neys and its regulatory body, the Board of Professional Responsibility, in
the strongest possible economic and political position. The state has as-
sured the public of being well informed and of having competent legal
services available at an economically competitive price. Further, under
the directive approach, law firms can effectively compete for potential
clients and clients can choose their attorneys intelligently by selecting
among known alternatives.44 The new element in open-ended attorney
advertising is not that it is commercial but that the consumer can be
more selective because of the availability of more information. The
open-ended approach to advertising neither forces liberalization of the
scope of attorney advertising nor does it leave attorneys without
standards.4
5
VI. FURTHER EXPANSION AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE MINNESOTA
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD
With respect to advertising in Minnesota, the director of the Board of
Professional Responsibility has recently presented a concise summary of
what the Rules of Professional Responsibility allow in Minnesota:
1. Lawyers may advertise.
2. Lawyers may engage in direct mail and other written solicitation.
that DR 2-105(B) was too restrictive. See 341 N.W.2d at 285; see also MODEL CODE EC 2-
14, DR 2-105(A) (1980); MINN. C. PROF. RESP. DR 2-105(A) (1980); Heggland, Legal
Specialization.- The Need for Uniformity, 39 BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 1982, at 15 (historical
survey of the status of attorney specialization).
The In rejohnson decision has been highly publicized and is likely to have national
ramifications. See, e.g., Ashman, Minnesota OKs Advertising a Specialty Certification, 70 A.B.A.
J. 118 (1984); Rule Against Specialty Advertising Struck Down, 10 A.T.L.A. ADVOC., Feb. 1984,
at 1, 8; Kaplan, Minnesota Lifts Specialty Ad Ban, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 2, col. 4;
Minnesota Lawyers No Longer Barred from Advertising Legal Specialties, 52 U.S.L.W. 1101
(1984); Minnesota Ban on Advertising NBTA Trial Certiftation Held Unconstitutional, 27 ATLA
L. REP. 63 (1984).
44. See Hoover, Disciplinary Action-Only One Facet of Professional Self-Regulations, 51
HENNEPIN LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 10. Bonding of lawyers who handle client funds,
continuing legal education, specialization, peer review, and market competition augments
the formal rules and regulations. Minnesota lawyers are not limited to the Minnesota
Code. Attorneys may voluntarily follow guidelines of the ABA Model Code. Beyond this,
they may also follow guidelines disseminated by the Director of the Board of Professional
Responsibility. See, e.g., Opinions-Professional Responsibility Board, 37 BENCH & B. MINN.,
Feb. 1981, at 49; Hoover, Lawyer Advertising-Percentage Discounts on Fees, 39 BENCH & B.
MINN., Dec. 1982, at 51 (the Board issues formal opinions on professional responsibility
from time to time and the director issues a limited number of informal letter opinions
upon request).
45. An example of the current open-ended information dissemination process in Min-
nesota is the frequent articles by the Director of the Board of Professional Responsibility
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3. Advertising and permitted solicitation must refrain from utiliza-
tion of false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading information.
4. In person and telephonic solicitation, direct or indirect, is
prohibited.
5. The giving of value in exchange for a favorable recommendation
or reference is not permitted.
Questions of taste, dignity, and self-laudation are not usually relevant
to the question of whether discipline is appropriate.
46
Although these guidelines are highly persuasive authority for interpret-
ing the Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility, the ultimate
binding authority rests with the Minnesota Supreme Court's rulings on
proposed changes in the Code and opinions on petitions for disciplinary
action.
47
VII. COMPARISON OF THE ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION RULES
As is evident from the most recent guidelines from the Minnesota di-
rector, much of the latest activity in the area of advertising has occurred
in the area of solicitation.48 Although advertising and solicitation have
much in common, they are not identical. Solicitation is direct communi-
cation and advertising is indirect communication. The guidelines above
demonstrate that solicitation is more carefully monitored by the Profes-
sional Responsibility Board than is advertising. Solicitation, also, focuses
primarily on the one-to-one aspect of communications rather than on
mass media marketing. Solicitation can be mass-produced, as in mass
mailing; but because the primary concern of the Minnesota Supreme
Court is the ultimate impact of one-to-one communications on the con-
sumer of legal services all solicitation will be closely scrutinized.
4 9
The most recent decisions on attorney advertising and solicitation
since Bates are directed more towards solicitation than advertising. 50 In
46. Hoover, Attorney Advertising is Here to Stay, 38 BENCH & B. INTERIM, Mar. 1982, at
6.
47. See In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981). The Appert court noted, "While
we are determined to comply with both the spirit and the letter of the United States
Constitution as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Bates, 1ntmus and
Ohra/ik, we are equally determined to do what we can to prevent and discourage abuses
that may occur." Id at 215.
48. See supra note 45 and guidelines in the accompanying text.
49. See Hoover, Attorney Advertising in Minnesota-Expanded Hortzons for the '80s, 50 HEN-
NEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 6-7. The object of solicitation can be either an individual
or a group addressed as having similar legal concerns, though usually not the members of
a class action. See id.; see also In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d at 215. The Minnesota court
defines solicitation as overbearing and intrusive practices by mail, telephone, or face-to-
face contact, and the giving of value in exchange for a favorable commendation or refer-
ence by a third party. Id.
50. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
[Vol. 9
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In re R.M.J., 5 the United States Supreme Court attacked regulative re-
strictions on marketing in Missouri.
Missouri followed a modified regulative model, as adopted in the ABA
Model Code, that set forth a laundry list of information which an attor-
ney could include in an advertisement or communicate in the solicitation
of his or her business. 52 In violation of the Missouri Code, the appellant
in R.M.J. sent out announcement cards including more information than
was specifically permitted and sent the cards to a general, though select,
audience of potential clients or referrals beyond the limited audience al-
lowed in the Missouri Code.53 Faced with the disciplinary charges of
unprofessional conduct and a potential reprimand, he argued against the
regulatory restrictions of the Missouri Code. Even though he violated
the Code, the United States Supreme Court said that his actions had not
been deceptive, misleading, or dishonest to the extent requiring
prohibition.
54
Restated in terms of a widely recognized constitutional standard of
review for commercial speech, the R.M.J. opinion applied the four-point
balancing test of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub/ic Service Commis-
sion. 55 The R.MJ. Court stated:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
51. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
52. See 42 Mo. ANN. STAT. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, DR 2-101(A)&(B)
(Vernon 1981); see also 455 U.S. at 193 n.1. For an article discussing the In re R.MJ.
decision, the events leading up to it, and its implications for the future of lawyer advertis-
ing, see Blackmar, supra note 25. See also Whitman & Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional
Status of Lawyer Advertising-Theoretical and Practical Implications of In re R.M.J., 57 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 445 (1983).
53. See 455 U.S. at 196.
Appellant graduated from law school in 1973 and was admitted to the Missouri
and Illinois Bars in the same year. After a short stint with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C., appellant moved to St. Louis, Mo.
in April 1977, and began practice as a sole practitioner. As a means of announc-
ing the opening of his office, he mailed professional announcement cards to a
selected list of addresses. In order to reach a wider audience, he placed several
advertisements in local newspapers and in the yellow pages of the local telephone
directory .... [T]hey contained, in large capital letters, a statement that the
appellant was "Admitted to Practice Before the United States Supreme Court."
And they included a listing of areas of practice that deviated from the language
prescribed by the [Missouri Advisory Committee].
Id.
54. See id. at 207.
[Although the States may regulate commercial speech, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require that they do so with care and in a manner no more exten-
sive than reasonably necessary to further substantial interests. The absolute
prohibition on appellant's speech, in the absence of a finding that his speech was
misleading, does not meet these requirements.
Id
55. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
19831
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provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
56
Within this context, the R.M.J decision explicitly allows states to regu-
late advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proven to be
misleading in practice, but only if serving a substantial interest within
the constitutional standard of review.
The Supreme Court found that Missouri had failed to show that the
proscribed statements were misleading, that the proscription promoted a
substantial state interest, and that possible deception could only be cured
by an absolute prohibition. 57 Hence, the Missouri rules were struck
down as violative of the first amendment. Nonetheless, the Court left the
door open for legitimate time, place, and manner regulations by the
state.
58
Although R.Mf. sets forth the standard of review for scrutinizing state
proscriptions, it gives very little insight into the kinds of conduct which
states may proscribe. The standard is developed in Bates, 59 Ohrahk v.
Ohio State Bar Association, 60 and In re Primus. 61 Together, these earlier
advertising and solicitation cases present a broad range of facts to com-
pare, and help attorneys and regulative bodies develop a better sense of
prohibited activities.
The Bates decision holds that lawyers can advertise fee information for
routine legal services as long as the advertising remains essentially objec-
tive, and does not make or strongly suggest qualitative comparisons be-
56. 455 U.S. at 203-04.
57. In making its decision, the R.M.J Court relied heavily upon the reasoning of the
Bates case. The Court pointed out that the Bates case rejected a number of justifications
for broad restrictions upon advertising including the so-called effects upon professional-
ism, justice, cost, quality, and enforcement. None of these were held to be sufficient to
compel state action. See id at 199-200; Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. at 363-65, 375.
58. See 455 U.S. at 203.
[The] commercial speech doctrine, in the context of advertising for professional
services, may be summarized generally as follows: Truthful advertising related
to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But
when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inher-
ently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact such advertising is
subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading ad-
vertising may be prohibited entirely. But the states may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing
of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.
Id
59. 433 U.S. 350 (1970).
60. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
61. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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tween providers.6 2 In Ohra/ik the Court holds that a state may discipline
an attorney who solicits clients by face-to-face or telephonic contact, es-
pecially when the client is vulnerable emotionally or physically, such as
during recuperation from accidental injury.63 The Court concluded that
a vulnerable "client" is in no position to intentionally select an attorney
or resist the direct persuasion of an opportunistic attorney.
64
Lastly, in In re Prizmus, the Court permitted direct mail and other writ-
ten solicitation of potential clients as long as the potential client is insu-
lated from in-person contact by the overreaching attorney. Factors
supporting direct mail solicitation are the non-profit motive of informing
the public of its legal rights and the lack of deception. The profit motive
may be present if it does not dominate.65 The Primus Court reversed a
decision to discipline an ACLU attorney for writing to offer free legal
counsel to a woman who possibly was sterilized as a precondition to re-
ceiving Medicaid benefits.
66
VIII. THE NEW CODE RULES FOR MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility was amended by
the Minnesota Supreme Court to reflect the holdings of Ohrahk and
PrimuS. 67 With the exception of the general prohibitions of in-person
and telephonic solicitation, coverage under the Minnesota Code DR 2-
103 follows the practical precepts that:
[G]eneral direct mail advertising is permitted, as is a specific written
communication to a prospective client seeking employment for a spe-
62. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
63. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. 477;see also Hoover, supra note 48, at 6. Hoover states that in
Ohrahk
[Tithe court held that a state may enforce disciplinary rules against attorneys
which prohibit attorneys from solicitation of employment for pecuniary gain
under circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences that the regulating
state has the right to prevent. In sustaining discipline for in-person solicitation of
a hospitalized patient, the Court held that protection of the public from those
aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, over-
reaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct is a legitimate and important
state interest.
Id
64. See Ohrahik, 436 U.S. at 461; Hoover, supra note 48, at 6.
65. See 11rbnus, 436 U.S at 415; Hoover, supra note 48,at 6. Hoover states:
[The Court in Prmus] held that solicitation of prospective litigants by non-profit
organizations that engage in litigation as a form of political expression is entitled
to First Amendment protection. An attorney who assisted a non-profit agency
by advising a gathering of women about their legal rights and by subsequently
writing to one of the women about free legal assistance from the organization,
was not disciplined.
Id
66. See Prmus, 436 U.S. at 436-38.
67. See MINN. C. PROF. RESP. DR 2-101 (1980); see also Hoover, supra note 5, at 11
(Director of Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board summarizes the effects of the May
30, 1980, Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court amending DR 2-101 - DR 2-105).
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cific legal matter. Attorneys may, for example, send bulk mailings to
everyone in an area offering to represent them generally. They may
also write a personal letter to an accident victim offering to handle the
victim's personal injury case. Both general and direct mail advertising
and specific letters soliciting a case must comply with the veracity re-
quirements of DR 2-101, as amended.
68
Deception and direct overreaching are the targets of the Minnesota
Code,69 and not the routine dissemination of objective information
through indirect media.
70
In 1982, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in In re Appert, adopted the
position recommended by the Director of the Board of Professional Re-
sponsibility, that expanded and defined contextual limits to advertising
and solicitation in Minnesota. 7I The case expands the scope of permissi-
ble solicitation to allow multiple referrals by a third party. 72 It also con-
dones advertising of attorney availability to handle recurrent product
litigation on a contingent fee basis. 73 Lastly, it emphasizes that litigation
directed against obvious social abuses or inequities enjoys the added first
68. Hoover, supra note 48, at 7-8.
69. See In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 215 (Minn. 1982). The Appert court stated,
"We view the right of the general public to know of the availability of professional services
as the principle interest involved in advertising for such services. Advertisements designed
to achieve less important objectives will be subject to a more critical scrutiny." Id.
70. See Hoover, supra note 5, at 11; see also MINN. C. PROF. RESP. EC 2-6 to EC 2-15,
DR 2-101 to DR 2-102 (1980).
71. See Hoover, supra note 46, at 6.
In Appert . . . the Supreme Court held that direct mail solicitation and the dis-
tribution of brochures describing Respondent's availability for certain kinds of
cases were entitled to constitutional protection. In dismissing the disciplinary
petitions, the Court embraced fully the principles embodied in Bates, making
clear that discipline is appropriate only when letters or brochures contain false,
fraudulent, deceptive or misleading information.
Id.
72. See 315 N.W.2d at 212-15.
No exchange of value took place in this case. The research information and
advice given by respondents to Ms. Brown was wholly gratuitous. Additionally,
it was only natural for Ms. Brown to look to respondents for background mate-
rial. They had represented her in her own suit against Robins, respondent Pyle
had been one of her instructors, and she was aware that they had a certain exper-
tise in the matter.
. . . Because of her own limited knowledge of attorneys who could handle
such involved litigation work, it is not likely that Ms. Brown could have confi-
dently made a referral to anyone other than respondents. The facts indicate that
respondent Pyle informed Ms. Brown that such referrals were permissible.
There is no suggestion, however, that either of the respondents requested that
such referrals be made.
Id at 214.
73. In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d at 209; see 5 HAMLINE L. REv. 453 (1982). This case-
note summarizes the holding of the court in Appert in the context of the other leading cases
of Bates, Primus, and Ohralik. The note is critical, however, of the Minnesota court for not
providing regulative guidelines in the areas of advertising and solicitation. The note did
not call attention to the fact that if the court had set forth regulative guidelines, it would
have been abandoning the directive approach taken by the MINN. C. PROF. RESP. and
[Vol. 9
13
et al.: Attorney Advertising in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN MINNESOTA
amendment protection of political expression under NAACP v. Button. 74
The Appert decision clarifies earlier Minnesota positions on attorney
advertising. Retrospectively, the Appert court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility disciplinary rule
that has long since been discarded and replaced by amendment. 75 Pro-
spectively, it suggests where Minnesota may be headed in helping to bet-
ter distribute effective legal services to the public at reasonable cost. 76
Finally, in terms of policy, the Appert opinion suggests that non-deceptive
aggressive marketing of legal services is justified to counterbalance ag-
gressive marketing of a product known by its seller, but not its buyers, to
be potentially dangerous.77 Information, not marketing, has been given
policy priority. Legal services advertising is an effective vehicle for giv-
ing balanced information to the consumer in an unbalanced
marketplace.
IX. THE MODEL RULES
AsAppert and the national trend as evidenced in R.Mf suggest, move-
ments in attorney advertising and solicitation have been toward liberali-
zation. The constitutional protections of the individual rights of
attorneys to express themselves and to associate freely in society, added
to the public's need to have access to useful information regarding legal
services, have supported the trend against highly restricted commercial
regulation of marketing.78
risking the very sort of regulations struck down in R.M.J and Bates as being an infringe-
ment upon free speech.
74. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the Court held that regulation of first amendment
expression is inherently suspect and that such regulation must be narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary restriction of political expression, which included litigation within such
expression.
75. See 315 N.W.2d at 208-12; Hoover, supra note 46, at 6. The Appert court held that
the former disciplinary rules of DR 2-101 and DR 2-103 were unconstitutionally restric-
tive of the respondent's first amendment rights to the extent that the rules prescribed
discipline for distribution of written materials, irrespective of content. See id.
76. See Hoover, supra note 44, at 10. The Director of Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board suggests that dignity and good taste do not need formal regulation
because scrutiny is already provided by self-discipline, peers, and market forces. See id.
77. See 315 N.W.2d at 212.
The characterization of respondents' letters and brochures as advertisements or
solicitation serves no useful purpose. The analysis to be made in either case is
essentially the same. The attorney's right to speak and associate freely and the
public's right to receive commercial information must be considered as well as
the state's interest in regulating the profession in order to protect the public from
abuses by lawyers. The balance is a delicate one and the lines are not easily
drawn. In this case, the individual and societal interests are substantial and the
state's interests, alone or in combination, are not sufficiently compelling to justify
a restriction of those first amendment rights.
Id.
78. See Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808, 809 (1982). "Law-
yer advertising at its best can inform people about their legal rights and help them make
1983]
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct recently adopted by the
ABA reflect the more lenient treatment of attorney advertising. Within
the Model Rules, advertising and solicitation are treated in the section
entitled "Information About Legal Services." 79 Significantly, and in ac-
cord with the current treatment of advertising in Minnesota, the Model
Rule on advertising is of the directive, as opposed to regulative, ap-
proach. The Proposal A laundry list which now distinguishes the Model
Code and its progeny from the Minnesota approach, has been dropped
from the Model Rules.8 0
In accord with the United States Supreme Court holding in R.MJ., 81
the Model Rules also permit an attorney to accurately describe his prac-
tice, without being restricted to often uninformative general headings
such as torts, contracts, or securities.8 2 Even the Model Rules, however,
stop short of allowing an attorney to claim a speciality or use words, such
as "limited to" or "concentrating in," that would imply a specialty.
83
Other than the attorney specialization limitation, the Model Rules place
no significant limitation upon the format a lawyer might adopt for ad-
vertising.84 For the most part, the dignity of the particular ad is left to
public, not professional, scrutiny as long as it is not deceptive or
misleading.85
Similarly, the Model Rules do not restrict an attorney to the print
media, but allow the use of broadcast media as well.86 For some states,
this is an innovation over past restrictive practices. 87 The Model Rules
are especially innovative in permitting direct mailings, now widely
an informed choice of attorneys to exercise those rights. Like Bates and In re R.MJ., many
state court cases have recognized the value of lawyer advertising." Id.
79. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1-7.5 (Proposed Final
Draft, 1982) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
80. See id. at Rule 7.1. Recently, the Ad Hoc Committee assigned by the Minnesota
Bar Association to study the Model Rules, recommended to the bar that the bar petition
the Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt a modified version of the Model Rules. See Minn.
B. Ass'n, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 41
BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 1984, at 31, 34 [hereinafter cited asMinn. Ad Hoc Comm. Report].
81. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
82. See MODEL RULES, supra note 79, at Rule 7.4.
83. See id at Comment to Rule 7.4. The Minnesota Ad Hoc Committee recom-
mended modifying Rule 7.4 to remove all restrictions from advertising a specialty except
the use of "any false or misleading statement, claim or designation ..... See Minn. Ad
Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 80, at 35, 56-57.
84. See Andrews, supra note 78, at 810. "The proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not contain provisions restricting the format of lawyers' advertisements. In
fact, the proposed rules specifically reject the current requirement of DR 2-102(A) that
communications about legal services be 'dignified.' " Id.
85. See MODEL RULES, supra note 79, at Rule 7.2 (1982).
86. See id
87. See Andrews, supra note 78, at 811. "In addition to state advertising rules that
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banned as impermisible solicitation.8 8 Yet, the United States Supreme
Court itself has drawn deliberate attention to the Proposed Model Rule
in its R.M.J. decision, which struck down certain mailing prohibitions in
Missouri. 89 The Court has also drawn attention to the fact that mailing
inserts sent out with billing statements are not necessarily an invasion of
privacy under Consohldated Edison v. Public Services Commission. 90
The one area where the Model Rules could possibly expand the scope
of attorney advertising beyond the current Minnesota Code would be in
the area of direct contact solicitation. Under the Model Rules, a lawyer
may solicit by personal contact while performing within the realm of
certain charitable organizations or social political associations that pro-
mote the availability of legal services. 9 1 This position is remarkably simi-
lar to that adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Appert. Under
no circumstances, however, may an attorney solicit either directly or by
mail where such solicitation is likely to harass, coerce, or otherwise detri-
mentally disturb the recipient of the communication. 92
X. CONCLUSION
Since the Bates decision, the legal profession has progressively over-
come the challenges to advertising that advertising would adversely af-
fect professional dignity; be inherently misleading; undermine standards
of justice; have undesirable economic effects on costs; reduce quality of
legal services; and lead to inadequately policed deception. 93 By giving
prevent lawyers from using certain types of mass media, provisions of the various state
solicitation rules restrict the lawyers' private promotional activities." Id
Of course, it remains to be seen whether the states that currently have a restrictive
approach to attorney advertising will adopt the approach in the Model Rules.
88. See MODEL RULES, supra note 79, at Rule 7.3 (direct mailings are still scrutinized
for potential harassment impact); see also In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682, 469
N.Y.S.2d 577 (1983) (the court, reconsidering on remand from the United States Supreme
Court in light of In re R.M.J., reaffirmed its position that lawyers may be prohibited from
sending to real estate brokers letters that state fees for real estate closings and implicitly
seek referrals of clients).
89. See 455 U.S. at 201 n. 14. The Court points out that the preferred remedy is more
disclosures, rather than less, in citing the Bates case and the proposed new Model Rule in
the context of public ignorance regarding rights and remedies.
90. 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.20 (1982).
The R.MJ. Court suggests that if a general mailing from a lawyer would be "frightening"
that the lawyer could stamp the envelope "this is an advertisement." Id.
91. See MODEL RULES, supra note 79, at Rule 7.3.
92. See MODEL RULES, supra note 79, at Rule 7.3(B). The Minnesota Ad Hoc Com-
mittee recommended modifying the Model Rules to permit all solicitation except if made
"in person or by telephonic contact." See Mtm. Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 80, at 35,
56.
93. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79.
There is currently a deemphasis in regulation of the "commercial" aspects of the
profession for both constitutional and practical reasons. . . . Practical reasons
require that overtaxed disciplinary resources be directed toward maintaining the
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the public credit for the ability to see through all but the most sophisti-
cated deceptive advertising, the profession may have actually enhanced
its stature in society and has certainly left the public better informed
about its options for legal services.
integrity of the profession leaving to some extent the commercial aspects of prac-
tice to regulation by the marketplace.
Hoover, supra note 46, at 6.
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